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3A SOVEREIGN EUROPE
How large should the European Union (EU) be? And what 
shape should it take? These are not new questions but have 
recently taken on a new form and seek to be answered with 
a sense of urgency that has been missing for some years.
French President Macron can be held primarily 
responsible for this shift of emphasis. He wants an EU 
that is conscious of, indeed self-confident about,  
its own sovereignty. Commission President Ursula  
von der Leyen’s claim to be running a “geopolitical 
Commission” plays into Macron’s argument: she was, 
after all, his choice for the top job. But a sovereign 
Union strutting its stuff on the world stage needs to 
have established a pretty firm view about where its 
own territory starts and stops, what values it aims to 
propagate on the global stage, and which interests it 
intends to advance vis-à-vis those of its international 
partners and rivals. 
The purpose of assuming EU sovereignty is to better 
protect the security of its states and citizens. It implies 
an intention to adopt a more proactive stance. Even if 
the Union still lacks all the attributes of a federal state, 
its claim to sovereignty is an important further step in 
the federal direction. A sovereign polity is in need of 
a government, and in particular a foreign policy. The 
innovation of Union sovereignty as a supplement to, if 
not a substitute for, national sovereignty should also 
contribute to a strengthening of civic rights that flow 
from the concept of EU citizenship.1
THE BRITISH COME AND GO
Needless to say, the other spur to this episode of 
EU self-assessment is the recent secession of one of 
its largest and most important members. From the 
earliest days, the six founding member states of the 
European Community were committed to the principle 
of enlargement, notably to include the United Kingdom 
(UK). In fact, the first twenty years of the Community’s 
life were preoccupied by the problem of what to do with 
the British. Should the UK join, and if so, on what terms? 
Britain contributed to this prolonged uncertainty by first 
refusing to sign the Treaty of Paris, by walking out of the 
Messina conference which led to the Treaty of Rome, by 
trying to establish an alternative centre of power on the 
European continent based on free trade only – and then 
finally by changing its mind and applying for the full 
European Economic Community membership.2
Once in, from 1973, the British proved just as 
destabilising as they had been when out. The UK 
immediately sought a renegotiation of its terms of 
membership, held a referendum on whether to stay 
or go, battled for generous budgetary rebates at the 
expense of the Six, demanded opt-outs on the single 
currency, social policy and interior affairs, resisted 
treaty change that would have moved the EU decisively 
from a confederation into a federal union, demanded 
another renegotiation – and held another referendum 
in 2016 resulting in Brexit. The EU’s current woes 
are exacerbated by the UK’s continuing difficulties in 
coming to terms with its departure from the Union. The 
nature of Britain’s future relationship with Europe has 
yet to be determined – but will certainly be special. 
Brexit has decisively confounded the 
Union’s historic mission of “ever  
closer union”.
 
The UK has bungled its secession from the European 
Union as well as its time as a member. There is collateral 
damage. Brexit has decisively confounded the Union’s 
historic mission of “ever closer union”.3 The rest of the 
world sees the EU without the UK as being left smaller, 
weaker and poorer. Internally, the EU 27 are still digesting 
the impact of Brexit, not only in terms of the budget. 
Emmanuel Macron, at least, has decided to use the 
pretext of Brexit to push for EU reform. In insisting on 
the deepening of integration before further enlargement, 
Macron returns to the policy of his predecessors Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing and François Mitterrand. 
WIDER AND DEEPER
In 1969, faced with the troublesome British, the Six 
settled upon a parallel strategy of widening and 
deepening. If the Community was to enlarge, it would 
have to integrate further. The UK must be bound into 
a stronger Europe. Ironically, the British supported the 
further expansion of the EU on the presumption that the 
addition of more members would weaken the centralising 
forces of Brussels and blunt the push to federalisation. 
4In 1993, faced with the break-up of the Soviet empire, a 
European Council meeting in Copenhagen established 
three criteria specifying the terms and conditions of 
enlargement.4 New member states, it was decreed, must 
be able to demonstrate:
1. stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities;
2. a functioning market economy and ability to cope 
with the competitive pressure and market forces 
within the EU;
3. an ability to take on all the obligations of 
membership, including the capacity to effectively 
implement the rules, standards and policies that 
make up the body of EU law (the ‘acquis’), and 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.
The ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 from 
15 members to 25 did not go as smoothly 
as hoped.
 
In theory, at least, a country must satisfy the first criterion 
for EU accession negotiations to be launched. All three 
should be satisfied for an accession treaty to be concluded. 
At first the Copenhagen criteria were envisaged as 
administrative tools to help the EU assess the eligibility 
of a candidate state, but they acquired a more political 
interpretation as theory hit the buffers of reality. 
In the event, the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 from 
15 members to 25 did not go as smoothly as hoped. 
The transition from communism took longer and cost 
more than expected. The capacity of the Union to adopt 
new members was sorely tested. Under pressure, the 
Union continued to widen while deepening faltered. 
Ambitious plans came and went to transform the whole 
nexus of the Union into a federal polity. Gradually the 
momentum behind political union faded. The single 
market was created but remains incomplete. The euro 
was introduced but is still not underpinned by a common 
fiscal policy. A constitutional treaty was ditched in 
2005; its replacement, the Lisbon treaty, remains 
under fulfilled. Today there are powerful forces within 
the EU from Central Europe which openly question 
the liberal democratic values of the West. Some EU 
national governments and courts directly challenge the 
supranational authority of the EU institutions. 
Today the Copenhagen criteria are 
discredited as a tool of enlargement.
 
Today the Copenhagen criteria are discredited as a tool of 
enlargement. Some candidate countries (notably Turkey) 
and now even some member states (Hungary and Poland) 
have slipped back from meeting the first criterion. The 
exercise of parliamentary democracy, it transpires, can be 
free in terms of electoral procedure but not fair in terms 
of political culture. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia 
are contemporary and not simply historic phenomena. 
Some ruling parties in EU member states are overcome 
by corruption and clientelism. And even after Brexit, how 
many EU governments genuinely adhere to the aims of 
political and economic union? 
One proposal of President Macron is to launch a wide-
ranging conference to rectify such matters. The plan for a 
Conference on the Future of Europe has been taken up by 
the European Parliament and, albeit less enthusiastically, 
by President von der Leyen.5 Another initiative of the 
French president is to block further enlargement unless 
and until governance of the EU has been adequately 
reformed. At the European Council in October 2019 
Macron vetoed the opening of accession negotiations 
with North Macedonia and Albania. 
THE DWINDLING QUEUE
In recent years, the threat to block further enlargement 
would not have had much impact. The Juncker 
Commission (2014-19) did next to nothing to move the 
dial on membership. In truth, there was hardly a queue of 
European countries waiting to join. European Free Trade 
Association members Norway and Iceland have rescinded 
their earlier membership applications. Switzerland is a 
law unto itself and has no intention of again becoming a 
candidate for EU accession. 
Turkey, which applied as long ago as 1987, has declined all 
opportunities to progress towards accession. It will need 
the replacement of the regime of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
by a secular, liberal government to rekindle Turkey’s 
dwindling chances of joining the EU. 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova have struck recent association 
agreements with the EU, none of which are held by Brussels 
to encourage EU membership ambitions – and all of which 
have provoked reaction from Moscow involving subversion 
and invasion. Having no qualms about asserting Russian 
sovereignty, it is clear that President Vladimir Putin will 
not permit any ex-Soviet state to cosy up further to the 
European Union. He may also have ambitions to prevent EU 
membership for the Western Balkans. There Putin vies with 
Erdoğan to shape events.
5THE WESTERN BALKANS
In 2003, in the heady days of the constitutional treaty, 
a European Council in Thessaloniki determined “to 
fully and effectively support the European perspective 
of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an 
integral part of the European Union once they meet 
the established criteria”. The Union promised to craft 
an “enriched Stabilisation and Association Process” as 
the “framework for the European course of the Western 
Balkan countries all the way to their future accession”. 
The Thessaloniki commitment seemed 
highly optimistic even in 2003.
 
The Thessaloniki commitment seemed highly optimistic 
even in 2003. No part of Europe has been so riven by 
religious and civil wars, even until modern times. The 
historic clash between the Slavic, Hellenic and Turkic 
civilisations seems still alive – sectarian, syncretic and 
unforgiving. The people of Yugoslavia and Albania 
suffered a quarter of a century of catastrophe since the 
collapse of the totalitarian regimes in the 1980s. Towns 
and villages were sacked, the countryside polluted, and 
many of those who could leave left. 
The region is still very poor. Average GDP per capita 
for the six countries is only half the average of Central 
Europe and just one-quarter of Western Europe. 
According to Eurostat’s 2018 index of GDP per capita,  
the EU’s poorest country Bulgaria scored 50.8 (EU  
average 100); Serbia only 39.5. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
launched its accession bid in 2004, followed by 
Montenegro in 2008, and Serbia and Albania in 2009. 
Negotiations started with Montenegro in 2012 and with 
Serbia two years later. The Macedonian bid was frozen 
because of Greek nationalist objection to the country’s 
name. After intense diplomatic effort under UN auspices, 
an accord was concluded on the shore of Lake Prespa in 
2018: FYROM became the Republic of North Macedonia. 
Albania’s bid, meanwhile, was frozen because of the 
systemic corruption of its rival ruling factions. 
Kosovo’s independence is bitterly resented by Serbia 
and is still not recognised by five member states of 
the EU (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). 
It can only be encouraging, therefore, that the new 
government in Pristina seems more amenable to a 
rapprochement with Belgrade. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
remains in a frozen civil war under the civilian and 
military supervision of the US and EU. 
In real terms, Montenegro is the furthest advanced 
towards completing the formal accession process. 
Somewhat alarmingly, it has even adopted the euro (as 
has Kosovo). But several member states will object to the 
idea that Montenegro should be allowed to join the Union 
on its own without a regional cohort. The truth is that the 
prospect of full EU membership is still a distant one for 
the whole region. The road from the Balkans to Brussels is 
long and arduous. 
For the European Union which prefers its 
members to be stable and well-ordered 
nation states, membership bids from  
small, dysfunctional Balkan states pose a 
real difficulty.
 
The Balkans has had no experience whatsoever of 
secular, liberal democratic states. Across the region 
where no simple nations exist, state building is still the 
order of the day. For the European Union which prefers 
its members to be stable and well-ordered nation states, 
membership bids from small, dysfunctional Balkan 
states pose a real difficulty.6
The immediate question is whether President Macron 
will lift his veto on the opening of accession talks for 
North Macedonia and/or Albania. Other member states, 
such as Denmark and Holland, are hiding behind France. 
Their dilemma is real: a negative decision will cause 
despair among liberal reformers in the Balkans; a positive 
decision is to risk a hostage to fortune. 
THE MACRON PROPOSAL
In November 2019 France published a non-paper 
“Reforming the European Union accession process”. It 
was refreshingly blunt:
“Closer ties between the European Union and 
the countries of the Western Balkans, and their 
effective accession once the European Union 
has been reformed and made more effective and 
responsive for its Member States and candidate 
countries, will also make Europe more sovereign 
and more united.”7
6According to Paris, the existing accession process is 
too slow to deliver concrete benefits for the citizens of 
candidate states, thereby fuelling emigration. The EU 
should take a firmer grip on a reformed process based on 
four principles: 
1. Negotiations organised around clusters of policy 
sectors into which advancing candidates would 
gradually be drawn;
2. Stringent conditions for effective convergence towards 
European norms over the long term in the rule of law 
and economic and social policy; 
3. Concrete benefits during the process, particularly 
through increased financial support; 
4. Reversibility of the process to incentivise it and ensure 
credibility. 
Instead of being faced with 35 chapters of EU acquis, 
each of which has to be separately opened and closed, 
enlargement talks would be reorganised in seven blocks 
of policy, opened successively. The closure of each cluster 
would allow the candidate admittance to certain EU 
sectoral programmes. Verifiable criteria for moving from 
one stage to the next would be spelled out precisely and 
would be “principally based on sustained, irreversible 
progress in the field of the rule of law”.8 Financial 
incentives could include disbursement from EU structural 
funds. Access to the single market should be left until 
the end. A graded and proportionate system would be 
established to row back from the accession process should 
circumstances demand it.
France also proposed that the Council should be 
more closely involved at each stage of the talks, and 
an annual summit should be organised between the 
European Council and the heads of the Western Balkan 
governments. 
Disregarding the fact that it is not in the 
interest of candidates to join a Union 
which is closed to reform, they insisted 
that “internal EU reform cannot be a 
precondition for enlargement”.
 
Predictably enough, the release of the French non-paper 
was met with a storm of criticism, not least from  
Skopje where the government that had signed the  
Prespa Agreement was destabilised. In December, nine 
Balkan-friendly member states, corralled by Austria, 
offered their own non-paper.9 Disregarding the fact that  
it is not in the interest of candidates to join a Union 
which is closed to reform, they insisted that “internal  
EU reform cannot be a precondition for enlargement”.10 
The nine proposed instead that the Balkan candidates 
should be invited to participate in the Conference on the 
Future of Europe. But the main difference with France 
was their suggestion that the seven clusters could be 
opened in parallel rather than consecutively. 
THE COMMISSION RESPONDS
On 5 February 2020 the Commission issued a 
communication proposing an improved methodology 
for enlargement.11 The document falls well short of 
revising the Copenhagen criteria but it does go more than 
halfway to meet the demands of President Macron. The 
Commission agrees to install a mechanism for reversing 
the process if necessary. It also accepts the need to 
implicate member states more regularly and politically 
in the enlargement process. (Here useful lessons can 
be drawn from the smooth cooperation between the 
Commission and Council over Brexit.)12
The Commission is right to put greater 
emphasis on the need for state building  
in the Western Balkans.
 
Making the Council more complicit in the progress of 
accession negotiations will help draw fire away from 
the Commission, which has been accused in the past 
of getting too close to corrupt (and unpopular) ruling 
parties in the candidate states. More transparency and 
predictability should be welcomed by both members and 
candidates. However, the Commission also knows it must 
not lose control of the technocratic side of the process. It 
will remain the monitor of the merit-based approach. 
The Commission is right to put greater emphasis on the 
need for state building in the Western Balkans. It accepts 
the concept of clusters, and agrees to prioritise the 
cluster on ‘fundamentals’: judiciary, human rights, public 
administration, the rule of law, governance and financial 
control. The Commission also foresees that candidate 
states could be involved in policy making in certain areas, 
such as Horizon Europe, as well as being consulted more 
directly on the Commission’s impact assessments, for 
example, on the Green Deal package in the context of the 
proposed enlargement. 
There should be closer coordination between the political 
aspects of enlargement and the economic development of 
the candidates. The importance of the stabilisation and 
7association agreements can be expected to be enhanced, 
along with commitment to spend more money through 
the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).13 The 
priority for the regional economy will be to attract foreign 
direct investment for job creation. Olivér Várhelyi, the 
Commissioner responsible for the enlargement dossier, 
assures us that this will be “our investment on our 
rules”.14 An investment package will be ready for a summit 
of the EU 27 and Western Balkan leaders scheduled for 
Zagreb on 6-7 May. 
SOME QUESTIONS TO ANSWER
The new Commission aims to rebuild trust in the 
enlargement process and to rekindle European 
aspirations particularly in the Western Balkans. However, 
as the European Council deliberates about whether to 
adopt new methodology for enlargement, it should first 
ask itself some questions. 
The Commission communication fails to establish a solid 
link between the domestic and foreign policy aspects of 
enlargement. The imperative of binding the Balkan region 
into the security nexus of the West is not mentioned, 
and no connection is made between the extension of the 
Union’s common foreign, security and defence policies  
on the one hand and NATO’s role on the other.15 The  
EU’s embarrassment over the recognition of Kosovo is 
passed over.
Whereas the French non-paper makes no reference to 
timetables or deadlines, the Commission proposes that 
each cluster should be opened and closed within twelve 
months. In itself, this imposes a curious and arbitrary 
schedule that may have no relevance either to the pace of 
the negotiations themselves or to political and economic 
cycles within candidate countries and the EU 27. 
It is also odd that the Commission puts so little emphasis 
on the need to involve the opposition parties, NGOs and 
civil society organisations of the candidate states in the 
accession process. As the British experience suggests, 
unless EU accession is anchored firmly in domestic 
politics as a bipartisan policy, reflecting the extraordinary 
diversity of fragile Balkan society, membership is unlikely 
to be a durable success. The business of European 
integration must involve effective checks and balances at 
the level of the member states as well as that of the EU.16 
Adhesion to the Union acquis requires putting in place a 
regulatory framework within each member state, trusted 
by the Commission, open to national stakeholders, 
beyond the reach of ministerial direction, with access 
to the courts. In the highly partisan and sectarian 
environment of the Western Balkans, such an essential 
national consensus will not easily be achieved. 
The stabilisation and association process for the Western 
Balkans places great emphasis on the need for inter-
regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. 
Such would be a first for the Balkans. Does the proposed 
new methodology build in sufficient ways and means to 
verify that the desired reconciliation is actually taking 
place? The EU has been deceived by candidates in the 
past about their willingness to settle historic disputes – 
both by the Republic of Cyprus in respect of the Turkish 
Cypriot community and by Croatia with regard to the 
Slovenian border dispute. The disintegration of UK 
membership of the Union has revealed as nothing else 
could the political and security sensitivities of the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. 
The addition of six small and poor states 
to the 27 current members would have 
serious repercussions for EU governance.
 
An immediate problem concerns the application of 
the new methodology to the accession process already 
underway with Serbia and Montenegro. How would a 
shift of the goalposts affect the progress of those already 
difficult negotiations? One assumes the new practice 
will be applied in due course to Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. Will Turkey be expected to follow suit? 
Although institutional and budgetary questions can be 
left until last, it would be unwise for the EU to neglect 
them. The addition of six small and poor states to the  
27 current members would have serious repercussions 
for EU governance. At the very least, in advance of  
the next enlargement the European Council should 
decide to reduce the size of the Commission, as 
the Lisbon treaty prescribes.17 This reform would 
increase the Commission’s efficiency and enhance its 
supranational authority. 
Likewise, the European Parliament should use its  
right of initiative to introduce a mathematical formula 
for the apportionment of seats between the member  
states. That reform would strengthen Parliament’s 
democratic legitimacy and end the present reliance  
on unseemly bartering.18
Furthermore, the system of rotating the presidency of the 
Council of ministers among the states every six months 
is no longer viable and should be terminated, with a 
consequent improvement to the quality of law making 
under the responsibility of the European Council.19
The Conference on the Future of Europe would be 
a suitable forum to discuss and settle all of these 
institutional matters.20 A successful Conference would 
make serious preparations for the next Convention that 
will be called upon in due course to revise the EU Treaties.
8THE DOUBTS REMAIN
Not least among the questions that need to be asked of the 
European Council concerns its own intentions. Is it being 
honest with the Balkan countries? Do these European 
leaders remain faithful to the commitment made by their 
predecessors at Thessaloniki in 2003? The European 
Council’s much-laboured New Strategic Agenda, presented 
in June 2019, tip-toed around enlargement. Waxing lyrical 
about the promotion of Europe’s interests and values in the 
world, the leaders said:
“The EU will promote its own unique model 
of cooperation as inspiration for others. It will 
uphold the European perspective for European 
States able and willing to join. It will pursue an 
ambitious neighbourhood policy.”21
For her part, President von der Leyen is more circumspect. 
She says, “It is in our common geostrategic interest to 
have the Western Balkans as close as possible to the 
European Union”.22
Not least among the questions that need  
to be asked of the European Council 
concerns its own intentions. Is it being 
honest with the Balkan countries?
 
Adoption of the Commission’s new methodology may 
facilitate membership for the Western Balkans, but it will not 
settle the question about whether the accession of the six 
countries to the Union is really in their or the Union’s best 
interests. The Commission declines to entertain any other 
possibility for the Western Balkans short of full membership. 
To pose the question, however, is not to doubt the validity 
of Article 49 TEU which lays down that any European state 
may apply to become a member. Every Western Balkan 
country has every right to file its application. 
Be that as it may, if the new methodology succeeds 
in making the member states more engaged in and 
responsible for enlargement policy, the basic ambiguity at 
the heart of the Copenhagen criteria will be exposed. For 
some states, enlargement is an instrument of EU foreign 
policy. For others, enlargement is more concerned with 
the integration capacity of the Union. The two objectives 
will not always be compatible – as the Brexit saga 
suggests. National priorities, and interests, differ. 
As we know, there are also divisions in the Council 
about the meaning of the rule of law and the EU’s role in 
enforcing it. Hungarian Commissioner Várhelyi denies 
that there are differences among member states about 
how to interpret the rule of law criterion in the context 
of the Western Balkans. The evidence, however, not least 
from Budapest, suggests otherwise. 
Even were there to be unanimity at the 
level of the European Council in favour of 
letting in more members, many national 
parliaments harbour latent hostility to 
further eastwards enlargement.
 
Article 49 goes on to say that the accession treaties 
are subject to the unanimous agreement of all member 
states, ratified in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. That is a high hurdle 
indeed. Even were there to be unanimity at the level 
of the European Council in favour of letting in more 
members, many national parliaments harbour latent 
hostility to further eastwards enlargement. Most 
members of the European Council head minority 
or coalition governments whose grip on national 
parliaments is slippery at best. Several, perhaps many 
member states, would be sure to hold referendums  
to ratify the accession treaties in which populist  
and nationalist parties would have a field day.  
One recalls how effectively Brexiteers exploited  
the fear of Turkish accession during the 2016 
referendum campaign. 
The Netherlands even held (and lost) a referendum on 
the ratification of the Ukraine Association Agreement. 
France held a referendum in 1972 on the accession of 
the UK, Ireland, Denmark (and Norway). In 2005, with 
Turkish membership in mind, France passed a law to 
make compulsory the holding of referendums on all EU 
enlargements, although this has since been modified to 
give the choice of holding a referendum to the discretion 
of either the President or National Assembly. Austria 
has also threatened enlargement referendums. As things 
stand, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán will relish the prospect of 
calling a referendum to block Balkan enlargement and 
stem the tide of immigration. 
OTHER OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE
The European Union offers no formal category of 
associate membership to its neighbours. Article 49 
leads only to full membership, and, as the UK has 
recently been reminded, comprises the only route to 
9that goal. Nevertheless, the Union offers the concept of 
close association to any interested third country (not 
necessarily European). Article 8 TEU enjoins the Union 
to “develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and 
good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations 
based on cooperation”.
The UK is being offered a negotiation of a formal 
association agreement based on Article 217 TFEU.23 
Every recent EU association has at its core a deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement plus long-term 
arrangements for joint governance. If the UK government 
is prepared to accept what is on offer from the EU, 
the British association agreement could be the most 
privileged partnership ever struck with a third country. As 
things stand, however, Prime Minister Boris Johnson is a 
man of lesser ambition, and it is rather unlikely that the 
final EU-UK pact will be a useful model for anyone else.24
The European Union has to learn how to 
manage differentiated integration across 
an increasingly demanding, complex, 
multi-tier Europe. 
 
What could be more attractive is an upgraded version of 
the type of association agreement struck with Ukraine.25 
Such a revitalised Eastern partnership template could 
be of particular interest to the Turks who share with 
the British an aversion to the pooling of national 
sovereignty. For Turkey the prospect of a viable, durable 
and dynamic association with the EU short of full 
membership would seem to offer an alternative solution 
to the present intractable situation. 
The European Union has to learn how to manage 
differentiated integration across an increasingly 
demanding, complex, multi-tier Europe.26 With Britain 
outside, the EU’s neighbourhood is no longer just 
composed of small, weak or poor states. Faced with this 
newly challenging situation, the EU needs to be well 
governed at the centre, with a clear strategic direction 
established by the European Council and a concentration 
of executive authority on the Commission. 
The Austrians and their Central European friends are 
wrong to imagine that concentric circles of decreasing 
levels of integration can be well managed without 
significant political reform. Equally, the Dutch and their 
‘frugal’ friends are wrong to believe that the EU can 
prosper without a steady but significant increase in its 
budget. By way of its commercial clout and legal integrity, 
the EU wields enormous normative influence on the world 
economy, but when it comes to the limitations of Europe’s 
soft power, the Americans are lucid critics. 
As far as security and defence policy is concerned, the 
European Council harbours divergent views about the 
utility and future direction of NATO but has not been 
able to articulate a cogent case for the reform of the 
transatlantic partnership. A genuinely “geopolitical 
Commission” would be preparing the heads of 
government to strengthen the EU’s direct engagement 
with NATO, taking a lead rather than trotting on behind 
ill-thought-through decisions of the Atlantic Alliance 
about its own expansion into former Soviet territory – 
and near paralysis about its relations with Turkey.
Passive and polite cooperation between the two 
Brussels-based organisations is an inadequate basis for 
fresh strategic thinking about Western interests. The 
EU’s claim to autonomous sovereignty will be spurious 
if it is content to lease its security and defence to NATO. 
Donald Trump’s possible re-election in 2020 coupled 
with the UK’s isolationist stance accentuates the need 
for a greater EU role in NATO. 
A CONTINENTAL STRATEGY
A new enlargement policy must find its place at the heart 
of the Union’s strategic agenda and be grounded on a 
hard-headed assessment of the long-term prosperity 
and security interests of the Union. The strategy must 
be explained and justified not just at the level of the 
EU institutions but in national parliaments and public 
opinion, too. EU citizens deserve reassurance about the 
boundaries of their newly sovereign union. 
It is no longer credible to continue dishing 
out false hope to prospective candidates 
for full membership.
Citizens of neighbouring countries are equally deserving 
of transparency. It is no longer credible to continue 
dishing out false hope to prospective candidates for full 
membership. As far as the Balkans are concerned, it has 
always been dishonourable to pretend we will let them 
in when they pretend to be ready. Neither diplomatic nor 
democratic, the age of pretence is surely over. 
The EU needs a continental strategy that works at home 
and abroad – both fulfilling its foreign policy goals and 
serving to strengthen integration. The whole of the Union’s 
neighbourhood will be implicated in this strategy. One 
hopes that one or more candidate states will soon speak 
out in favour of a stronger, more federal and sovereign 
Union. A weak Union, ever resistant to reform, will not be 
able to sustain a strategy across the wider Europe. 
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The new strategy must recognise, first, that not all of 
the EU’s neighbours want to become full member states 
and, second, that several of the neighbours who may 
want to be full members cannot realistically fulfil the 
terms of membership. For those countries, an advanced 
association agreement may be the best solution, at least 
for the medium term. As far as today’s EU is concerned, 
the promise of an association agreement is certainly more 
deliverable than the mirage of full membership. 
The EU needs a continental strategy that 
works at home and abroad – both fulfilling 
its foreign policy goals and serving to 
strengthen integration.
 
President Macron has prompted a much-needed moment 
of reflection in the Western Balkans. Let us hope the new 
EU leadership knows how to use this time well. 
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